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Toward a Theology of Infertility and the
Role of Donum Vitae
KATHRYN LILLA COX Q1
College of St. Benedict/St. John’s University
A theology of infertility is needed to help couples and the broader ecclesial community
understand the theological implications of infertility. Infertility raises questions about
human freedom, finitude, embodiment, childlessness, and parenthood. In this article,
dominant cultural assumptions surrounding each of these areas when considering repro-
ductive technologies are sketched. Official Roman Catholic teaching on reproductive tech-
nologies (Donum Vitae), while rejecting most forms of such technologies, does provide a
viable response to the presupposition that reproductive technologies resolve infertility.
Given the dominant cultural assumptions and insights from Roman Catholic teaching,
this article advocates for several ecclesial changes when considering infertility. Finally, theo-
logical resources for developing a theology of infertility are offered. Specifically, insights
from Karl Rahner’s theology of concupiscence are examined with an eye toward how
they provide a framework for rethinking the cultural assumptions about freedom and
finitude when considering reproductive technologies.




T would seem that assisted reproductive technologies aimed at
helping people achieve pregnancy provide an answer to infertility.
The cultural message is that one does not need to be childless if
one has the economic means, the emotional stamina, and the work flexibility
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 Throughout the article, “assisted reproductive technologies” and “reproductive technol-
ogies” will be used interchangeably.












































to pursue pregnancy and childbirth with the help of medical science.
However, assisted reproductive technologies are not without controversy;
the issues surrounding them are varied and complex. Rather than focusing
on the ethics surrounding specific technologies, I will instead explore what
resources the Christian tradition offers toward developing a theology of infer-
tility. Articulating a theology of infertility is important, since Catholic teaching
bans the use of most reproductive technologies, and reproductive technol-
ogies are successful approximately – percent of the time. As a result,
many infertile couples still need to grapple with childlessness and how it is
understood in relation to their faith.
While Scripture does not directly speak to the ethics of reproductive tech-
nologies, the narratives we read, pray during the Liturgy of the Hours, study,
reflect on, and hear proclaimed during worship shape our responses to infer-
tility. Scripture indicates, and tradition reaffirms, that children are a gift from
God. However, the laments of Sarah, Rebekah, Rachel, and Hannah highlight
 The issues include the procurement of sperm, the status of the embryo, the goods of mar-
riage, universal norms/absolute norms, the nature of the person in relation to faith, our
understanding of parenthood, the role of the will of God in creation, the distinction
between morality and public policy, the understanding of natural law, and economic
questions, among others. The series Readings in Moral Theology, ed. Charles Curran
and Richard McCormick (New York: Paulist, –) examines many of these themes.
See also Maura Ryan, The Ethics and Economics of Assisted Reproduction: The Cost of
Longing (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, ); John F. Kilner, Paige C.
Cunningham, and W. David Hager, eds., The Reproduction Revolution (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, ).
 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life
in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation (Donum Vitae), March , 
(Boston: Pauline Books and Media, ); also available at http://www.vatican.va/
roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc__respect-
for-human-life_en.html (the English translations vary slightly; I have used the Pauline
Books version); Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Certain
Bioethical Questions (Dignitas Personae), December , , http://www.vatican.va/
roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc__dignitas-
personae_en.html. While released in December , Dignitatis Personae was approved
on June ,  by Pope Benedict XVI and signed by William Cardinal Leveda, prefect
for the CDF, on September , .
 The success rate varies for any number of reasons, including age, where younger
women have more success becoming pregnant with reproductive technologies
than older women. On the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site, see
“Infertility FAQ’s,” http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/Infertility/index.htm. The
statistics cited in the FAQ’s come from data in two reports from the CDC,  ART
Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report (http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART/index.htm)
and  ART National Summary Report (http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART/
NationalSummary_index.htm).










































the perception that God could withhold that gift. For example, Rachel
despairs of having children and rejoices when she eventually bears a son
(Gen :–, –). In the ancient world, a childless man solved his
problem by having children with a second wife, or with a surrogate. A child-
less woman, on the other hand, suffered reproach, shame, and disgrace.
Infertility was perceived as a sign that the woman had somehow displeased
God. Conception and a child affirmed that God was pleased, and assured
the woman’s place in the ancient household. Thus the word emerging from
Scripture can be experienced as both a blessing and a curse.
On a theoretical level, we might suppose we no longer believe that a
woman is incomplete unless married with children. But do we still act from
the beliefs that a woman is incomplete unless she can biologically bear a
child, and that infertility is a sign of God’s displeasure. Consequently,
then, do we implicitly believe there is something wrong with a woman
(and, by implication, a couple) who does not have biological children, who
does not seek a medical remedy for infertility (either her own or her hus-
band’s), and who might not adopt children?
The normative cultural and ecclesial narrative presumes that a woman
and man fall in love, marry, and have biological children. For Catholics,
receiving the sacrament of marriage requires that the couple be open to chil-
dren, with the underlying assumption that this openness means biological
children. This presumption is exposed when the presider at the marriage cer-
emony asks a couple beyond childbearing years if they are open to children,
often eliciting laughter from the congregation. Yet it seems normal when a
younger couple is asked the same question, and infertility as a possibility
goes unacknowledged. Couples do not hear the question, “Are you willing
to accept the possibility of infertility or the inability to bear biological chil-
dren?” What happens, then, as the marriage progresses and biological chil-
dren do not arrive? How is one to understand the inability to become or
remain pregnant? Where does the infertile couple fit in the theological
picture of love, marriage, and children? What challenges does infertility
pose to our self-understanding, individually, as a couple, and as a
 I would argue that these same presuppositions underlie, in part, the critique of celibacy
as a valid and worthwhile vocation, as well as human discomfort with singleness beyond
a certain age. However, the similarities and differences between celibacy, single life, and
married childlessness cannot be explored in this paper.
 In this article, I rely on a definition of marriage as between one man and one woman. I
remain cognizant of the debates in contemporary society regarding expanding the defi-
nition of marriage to include same-sex couples. Additionally, since this article focuses on
infertility, I will frequently use the term “infertile couple,” even though those who suffer
from infertility are defined by more than their infertility.










































community? Is our imagination and tradition supple enough to understand a
man or woman as fully human, without being a biological parent, particularly
within a marriage? What does the Catholic tradition offer to help the infertile
couple understand their place in the Body of Christ? More specifically, given
the limited success of reproductive technologies and the number of infertile
couples who do not use them for various reasons, what theological and eccle-
sial resources exist to begin developing a theology of infertility that can
answer these questions?
To begin a consideration of a theology of infertility, I will proceed in the
following fashion. In section , I will sketch an outline of the dominant cul-
tural assumptions operating in the use and ethical assessment of reproductive
technologies. Section  offers a brief overview of the Roman Catholic Church’s
recent moral tradition regarding reproductive technologies and the potential
conflict the tradition poses for the infertile, particularly women. In this section
I will also explore how the teaching opens space for rethinking infertility. In
section , I will argue for the potential that Karl Rahner’s theology of concu-
piscence holds for a theology of infertility. Additionally, I will suggest potential
pastoral changes the Church can make and other potential theological venues
that warrant further study in order to develop a theology of infertility.
. Dominant Cultural Assumptions Surrounding Assisted
Reproductive Technologies
The portrait that follows is a generalization. Yet, sketching the broad
contours is necessary and important because reproductive technologies are
often presented as good or morally neutral. Laying out operating assumptions
regarding their use makes it easier to identify areas that need to be addressed
when developing a theology of infertility.
In the United States, at least two presuppositions underlie our twenty-first-
century approach to reproduction and infertility. One, the myth of the
American Dream—the belief that we will succeed and accomplish anything
we wish as long as we work hard enough—encourages us to think we can
conquer infertility. Nadine Pence Frantz and Mary Stimming describe the
phenomenon in this way: “We have come to expect that we should be able
to achieve the particular future of our desiring.” This includes children.
 For additional questions that need further study, see Kevin T. Kelly, Life and Love:
Towards a Christian Dialogue on Bioethical Questions (London: Collins Liturgical
Publications, ), –.
 Nadine Pence Frantz and Mary T. Stimming, eds., Hope Deferred (Cleveland: The Pilgrim
Press, ), .










































Two, our culture primarily celebrates reproductive technologies while mostly
ignoring their detrimental effects. This “celebration” occurs in prime-time
news stories about multiple births, feature stories on talk shows like Oprah,
reality shows such as (the now-canceled) Jon & Kate Plus , and articles or
reports describing new advances in medical science. The reports or feel-
good stories rarely if ever offer critical analysis of the technology. The cele-
bration rightly acknowledges growth in scientific knowledge, the results of
human creativity, and the birth of children. Yet this celebration glosses the
pain and suffering that often precedes the successful use of assisted reproduc-
tive technology or that results from its failure. Furthermore, the celebration of
reproductive technologies neglects the fact that technology is not value-
neutral. John Staudenmaier, an historian of technology and culture, argues
that technological inventions embed and cultivate values. As a result, any
technology needs examination that explores the values that are being pro-
moted, protected, or overlooked. The theologian Richard McCormick, in a
different vein, contends that “bioethical thought—and indeed health care
planning in general—can be profoundly influenced by certain cultural
assumptions, trends, unexamined attitudes, biases—what I shall call ‘value
variables.’” If we take Staudenmaier and McCormick seriously, then we
need to ask what cultural assumptions or values need scrutiny in light of
assisted reproductive technologies. Assisted reproductive technologies
surface cultural assumptions, unexamined attitudes, and questions regarding
 Maura A. Ryan, “Particular Sorrows, Common Challenges: Specialized Infertility
Treatment and the Common Good,” Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics ():
–; see  n. .
 An exception to this celebration was the critical coverage of the birth of octuplets to
Nadya Suleman in . Given the positive coverage of other multiple births, one
wonders if part of the criticism was due to her single status, raising the question of
whether the coverage would have been more positive if she had been married. The
influence of Oprah Winfrey’s talk show in framing and thinking about various cultural,
political, and ethical issues, such as the ethics of assisted reproductive technologies are
beyondwhat can be considered in this article. For an examination of Oprah’s media influ-
ence, see Trystan T. Cotten and Kimberly Springer, Stories of Oprah: The Oprahfication of
American Culture (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, ): Kathryn Lofton,
Oprah: The Gospel of an Icon (Berkeley: University of California Press, ).
 John M. Staudenmaier, SJ, “Electric Lights Cast Long Shadows: Seeking the Greater Good
in a World of Competing Clarities,” April , , Boardman Lectureship in Christian
Ethics, ed. Adam Graves, http://repository.upenn.edu/boardman/; Staudenmaier,
“To Fall in Love with the World: Individualism and Self-Transcendence in American
Life,” Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits . (May ), –.
 Richard A. McCormick, Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral Theology (Kansas City,
MO: Sheed & Ward, ), –.










































how we comprehend human freedom, finitude, and embodiment as well as
how we understand childlessness and parenthood. Some brief consideration
will be given to each “value variable” just named.
Freedom
In a modern context, freedom frequently functions as the ability to
have options, to choose among objects, and to exercise one’s rights.
Furthermore, humans often understand freedom as the ability to control
their destiny and the outcome of their endeavors. This type of freedom,
freedom of choice, operates in approaches to reproductive technologies in
a variety of ways. The philosopher Karey Harwood discusses the “consu-
mer” language, mentality, and framework operating in this style of reproduc-
tive-choice-as-freedom. Freedom understood as choice appears, for
example, when people shop for the clinic with the best success rates, when
they screen embryos to increase the chance of implantation, in advertise-
ments requesting egg donors with specific criteria, or in the screening of
sperm donors for desirable characteristics.
There are at least two ironies in thinking about freedom of choice as pro-
viding options and reproductive technologies. The first is that one’s socioeco-
nomic status can hinder one’s ability to avail oneself of certain types of
reproductive technologies. Maura Ryan details this reality in The Ethics and
Economics of Assisted Reproduction: The Cost of Longing. The second
irony involves both the perception that a couple should or will use reproduc-
tive technologies, and the desire for the technology to “fix” infertility. Both
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago, ), –.
In this work, Arendt analyzes human alienation from each other and the world. One
aspect of her analysis focuses on human attempts to control and dominate “nature.”
Her critique of homo faber, our relationship to work and labor, and utilitarianism
can also be applied to notions of human freedom. Thus we can arrive at a negative
definition of freedom. Freedom does not permit unlimited choices, nor does it
permit treating others through the lens of their usefulness or as an object or means to
an end.
 See Lisa Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics (; reprint, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, ), chap. .
 Karey Harwood, The Infertility Treadmill: Feminist Ethics, Personal Choice, and the Use of
Reproductive Technologies (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, ).
 Ryan, The Ethics and Economics of Assisted Reproduction. Access to reproductive technol-
ogies is alleviated for some when they use a surrogate in India. This type of “medical
tourism” is growing, highlighting the belief that we should have freedom of choice and
access to all options for pursuing our dreams and fulfilling our desires. See Nilanjana
S. Roy, “Protecting the Rights of Surrogate Mothers in India,” New York Times,
October, , .










































actually function to make it hard to say “no” to the technology. For example,
Harwood observes that while the nonprofit advocacy organization RESOLVE:
The National Infertility Association sees the “decision to remain ‘child-free’”
as a response to infertility, “few if any of the people who came to the monthly
RESOLVE meetings had not tried or were not considering some form of infer-
tility treatment.” Thus, saying “no” to reproductive technologies is often
saying “no more,” rather than simply “no” at the outset. Connected to the
ability to say “no” as one type of free choice is how humans respond to
human finitude.
Finitude
Underlying the anguish, sorrow, and despair that one hears in the
questions of those wrestling with infertility (such as “If I want a baby, why
can’t I have one?” or “Why won’t my body cooperate?”) is the reality of our
inability to transcend the limits of human finitude. Infertility profoundly
brings home the reality that we are finite, contingent creatures, who do not
control all aspects of our lives. Infertility harshly illuminates the lies that
“we can have it all” or “if we only work hard, we can accomplish anything.”
Infertility forces people to grapple with these lies when they do not get
immediately pregnant, when they are told they are infertile, when various
reproductive technologies do not work, or if they chose to follow their
church’s ban on certain reproductive technologies. This is a painful reality
for both men and women in different ways. Miroslav Volf describes this
reality as a “poison and a curse” and laments, “One hundred months’
worth of hopes, all dashed against the stubborn realities of bodies that just
wouldn’t produce offspring.” Ryan writes about the lie in this way: “As
the quite normal expectation of growing up, marrying, and raising a family
of one’s own begins to appear out of reach, so the assumption that the
course of one’s life is predictable and subject to the powers of reason and
 Harwood, The Infertility Treadmill, . RESOLVE is a national nonprofit organization
founded in . It offers support groups and takes various advocacy roles governing
reproductive technologies. For more information see the RESOLVE web site at http://
www.resolve.org.
 McCormick, Corrective Vision, . McCormick argues that “value variables” are inter-
twined with and nourish each other. Therefore, “value variables” often need to be exam-
ined together.
 Miroslav Volf, introdution to Frantz and Stimming, Hope Deferred, vii. The book Hope
Deferred is a collection of essays by theologians who have suffered some form of repro-
ductive loss, including infertility. Insights into the tussles with finitude are found
throughout the essays.










































will becomes a lie.” These particular experiences of finitude arise from the
body not doing what is normally expected. As a result, the body receives
attention in a different manner.
Embodiment
Our bodies matter. Women experience bodily changes every month
from puberty to menopause. At some point, for most women, this monthly
bodily fluctuation becomes an event requiring little attention or reflection.
However, for the woman trying to get pregnant, the monthly hormonal
changes and resulting flow of blood are reminders that her body is “misa-
ligned” with her heart and its desires. This can feel like death and sub-
sequently causes suffering.
In addition to the dissonance between body and heart, women bear the
greater physical burden of infertility. They are tested more frequently than
their spouses. Some women’s reproductive systems are found to be fine,
and the infertility occurs because of an issue with the male’s biology. Male
infertility, though, often means that the woman still needs treatment.
Women thus withstand the worst of medical interventions when attempting
pregnancy. In light of cases such as these, Judith Lorber has raised the ques-
tion of the value of women’s altruism in shouldering the burden of infertility,
even when their husband is infertile.
The question of whether women should subject otherwise healthy bodies
to medically invasive procedures raises the additional question of how to clas-
sify infertility. Medically speaking, humans subject their bodies to many
painful procedures in the hope of future health, defined as a restoration of
proper bodily functioning. Understood in this context, classifying infertility
as a disease draws attention to the need to determine underlying causes for
infertility, increasing the potential for restoring reproductive functioning.
 Ryan, “Particular Sorrows,” . For more patient perspectives, along with some analysis
of the emotional and psychological effects of infertility and the use of reproductive tech-
nologies, see “Patient Perspectives,” in Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Analysis and
Recommendations for Public Policy (New York: The New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law, ), –.
 For a description of the dimensions of this suffering, see Ryan, “Particular Sorrows,”
–; Nadine Pence Frantz, “Why,” in Frantz and Stimming, Hope Deferred, –,
at –; Mary T. Stimming, “Sorrow,” in Hope Deferred, –, at .
 Judith Lorber, “Choice, Gift, or Patriarchal Bargain? Women’s Consent to In Vitro
Fertilization in Male Infertility,” in Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics, ed. Helen
Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, ),
–.
 The Pope Paul VI Institute in Omaha, Nebraska, is addressing these issues.










































On the one hand, this is a positive outcome. On the other hand, the “techno-
logical cure” is not always equivalent to “healing” more broadly defined.
“Healing” more broadly construed applies to different dimensions of
human existence, such as the bodily, emotional, and spiritual dimensions.
Ryan highlights this when she asks “whether individuals now being offered
treatment for infertility . . . are in general being healed by the experience.”
Attending to the question of health and how to classify infertility is important
because the quest to become pregnant and to “heal” the body by means of
technology can lead to spiritual disease and ill health. For example, Mary
T. Stimming writes that, for her, the pursuit of pregnancy eventually func-
tioned as a form of idolatry. Using Paul Tillich’s notion of “ultimate
concern,” she reflects on how pregnancy, not God, became the “center of
her life.”
Given the amount of time women spend infertile during puberty, perime-
nopause, menopause, and even most days during their supposedly fertile
years, perhaps we should also perceive of infertility, no matter when it
occurs, as an ordinary dimension of being human. Noticing infertility as
part of the rhythm of our bodies might open a space for saying “no” to
certain medical treatments and help counter the lure of what Harwood has
called “the infertility treadmill.” This “no” then creates a space to consider
saying “yes” to something else. However doing so means considering how
the body’s infertility causes one to confront cultural assumptions about
childlessness.
Childlessness
Celebrating reproductive technologies leaves unchallenged the unspo-
ken, unexamined societal assumption that we are somehow incomplete as
human beings without children. Evidence of this presumption exists, for
example, in the question “Do you have children?” If one answers “no,”
often the next question is, “When are you planning to have children?”
Many people do not realize that someone might be infertile. Mercy Amba
 See Kenneth D. Alpern, ed., The Ethics of Reproductive Technology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, ).
 Ryan, “Particular Sorrows,” –.
 Stimming, “Sorrow,” –.
 See Linda A. Mercadante, “Faith,” in Frantz and Stimming,Hope Deferred, –; Nadine
Pence Frantz and Mary T. Stimming, introduction to Hope Deferred, –. Frantz and
Stimming draw on several authors in their discussion, including Laurie Lisle, Without
Child: Challenging the Stigma of Childlessness (New York: Ballantine Books, ), and
Elaine Tyler May, Barren in the Promised Land: Childless Americans and the Pursuit of
Happiness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ).










































Oduyoye, a Methodist theologian from Ghana and founder of the Circle of
Concerned African Women Theologians, writes that people have said to
her, “Don’t say ‘no’, say ‘not yet.’”
Oftentimes, silence greets a response of “No, I do not have children.” This
silence extends beyond societal convention to silence by the Christian church
on the role of the married childless members of the Body of Christ. Oduyoye
directly challenges the Christian church’s silence.
The “child factor” in Africa (and perhaps elsewhere) is complex, and its
public faces are daunting; but nothing is more oppressive than the ordin-
ary meanings imposed on the absence of children in a marriage. The
silence that shrouds the issue compounds its potential for the disempow-
ering of women. Shall we continue to be silent, or shall we shape a theology
that is life-giving in a situation that is otherwise a context of death? The one
who sits on the throne says, “See, I am making all things new” (Rev. :).
Shall we not seek new life for the childless?
This is a difficult challenge given that the Judeo-Christian tradition empha-
sizes the importance of children within marriage. The ability to talk about
childlessness resulting from infertility also means examining the implicit
“norms” that govern the practice of parenthood.
Parenthood
Using or considering the use of reproductive technologies can indicate
a profound desire to have a biological child as the fruit and grace of a shared
love, commitment, and life together. Wanting to share a genetic connection
with one’s child cannot be overlooked or minimized. However, the desire
to “have a child of my own” can also belie a sense of ownership, undercutting
the very sense that children are a gift from God, a gift held in trust. Scripture
underlines this sense of gift. For example, Hannah’s response to God hearing
 Mercy Amba Oduyoye, “A Coming Home to Myself: The Childless Woman in the West
African Space,” in Liberating Eschatology, ed. Margaret A. Farley and Serene Jones
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, ), –, at .
 Ibid., .
 Cahill, Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, –.
 Reproductive technologies often keep the focus on the couple and the desires of the
potential parents. In other words, the technology, when successfully used, provides chil-
dren for childless couples. This is different from adoption, which, while fulfilling the
desire for a child, also finds parents for a parent-less child. See Klaus Demmer,
“Ethical Aspects of Reproductive Medicine,” in Andrology: Male Reproductive Health
and Dsyfunction, ed. Eberhard Nieschlag, Hermann M. Behre, and Susan Nieschlag
(New York: Springer, ), –.










































her plea for a child shows she recognizes her custodianship; she dedicates the
child to God ( Sam :–). Moreover, thinking about infertility within a
limited focus on biological parenthood risks denigrating the familial relation-
ships between children and the nonbiological adults in their lives, such as
adoptive parents, foster parents, or other child-raising scenarios.
From a theological perspective, focusing on biological parenthood poten-
tially ignores the Christian claim that we are all brothers and sisters in Christ,
responsible for each other, and that relationships based on discipleship are
not subordinate to biologically familial relationships. This theological tenet
opens up possibilities for understanding adoption not just as a second
choice when reproductive technologies fail, but instead as a Christian
response to care for God’s children. This is not to suggest that adoption is a
simple answer, since adoption itself has ethical implications. Rather, I
want to suggest we have to hold in tension the importance of biological con-
nections with the Christian belief that life-giving love transcends biological
connection.
Thus, the American landscape around reproductive technologies contains
some implicit assumptions that require consideration when developing a
theology of infertility. These assumptions include the ideas that freedom
equals the ability to choose among available options, that technology
can compensate for human finitude, that we need to subject our bodies to
all types of medical interventions, that women and men need children
to be complete, and that adoptive parenthood is inferior to biological
parenthood.
Before exploring resources for developing a theology of infertility, I want to
examine the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on reproductive technol-
ogies. This examination will further illuminate why a theology of infertility
is necessary.
. Infertility and Recent Roman Catholic Teaching on
Reproductive Technologies: Donum Vitae
The Catholic Church’s primary statement regarding the use of repro-
ductive technologies is the Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its
 Scott B. Rae and John H. Core, “Reproductive Technologies and the Theology of the
Family,” Ethics and Medicine . (Spring ): –.
 See, e.g., Stephen G. Post, “Adoption Theologically Considered,” Journal of Religious
Ethics . (March , ): –; for responses to Post’s essay, see Elizabeth
McKeown, “Adopting Sources: A Response to Stephen Post,” ibid., –; and
William Werpehowski, “The Vocation of Parenthood: A Response to Stephen Post,”
ibid., –.










































Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation (Donum Vitae), promulgated by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) on February , . In
December , the CDF released the Instruction on Certain Bioethical
Questions (Dignitas Personae), which affirmed Donum Vitae and addressed
questions that had arisen since Donum Vitae’s publication. Donum Vitae
will be the focus here, since it provides the foundational arguments against
most forms of reproductive technologies.
Donum Vitae begins by describing the proper use of technology in relation
to the beginnings of human life. It states that the proper use of technology is to
aid procreation and to serve humanity, in contrast to a misuse of technology,
which dominates and controls procreation, impinging on the values and
rights of the human person. Sadly, the instruction does not more fully
develop its assessment of technology’s positive and negative features. If the
CDF instruction had included a more robust theological discussion about
technology, it would have provided an additional moral framework for con-
sidering various reproductive technologies.
Instead, the CDF focuses its examination on the status of the embryo and
protecting the value of procreation within marriage in order to evaluate the
licitness of various reproductive technologies. Many have examined the
CDF’s arguments against various types of reproductive technologies found
in section  of Donum Vitae. What is missing, however, is an analysis of
Donum Vitae’s presumption that procreation means having biological chil-
dren, an assumption that does not hold in light of barrenness, which poses
a challenge for understanding the procreative aspect of marriage found in
Donum Vitae. Yet the instruction also affirms the intrinsic value, dignity,
 For several responses to and analyses of Donum Vitae, see Antonio G. Spagnola, Maria
L. Di Pietro, and Elio Sgreccia, “Reproductive Technologies in the Light of Vatican
Instruction,” Ethics and Medicine . (): –; Thomas A. Shannon and Lisa Sowle
Cahill, Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican “Instruction on
Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Human Reproduction”
(New York: Crossroad, ); Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, “Dignity of Procreation:
Science and the Creation of Life,” Origins . (May , ): , –.
 See, e.g., Thomas W. Hilgers and Sr. Marilyn Wallace, eds., The Gift of Life: The
Proceedings of a National Conference on the Vatican Instruction on Reproductive Ethics
and Technology (Omaha: Pope Paul VI Institute Press, ) (contributors include
Joseph Boyle, Rev. R. Cessario, Lorna Cvetkovich, Germain Grisez, Rev. R. Lawler,
William May, Rev. J. Sheets, Janet Smith, and William Wagner); Edmund D. Pellegrino,
John Collins Harvey, and John P. Langan, eds., Gift of Life: Catholic Scholars Respond
to the Vatican Instruction (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, ) (contri-
butors include J. Harvey, M. Damewood, J. Huber, J. Langan, B. Schüller, J. Haas, Msgr.
Sgreccia, and Lisa Sowle Cahill); Brian V. Johnstone, “The Instruction Donum Vitae and
Its Reception,” Studia Moralia  (): –.










































and worth of the infertile couple and their marriage. How do I arrive at these
conclusions?
In section  of Donum Vitae, the CDF delineates its position on assisted
reproductive technologies, ultimately concluding that both homologous
(using the wife’s eggs and the husband’s sperm) and heterologous (using
some combination of donor eggs or sperm) techniques are morally illicit.
The techniques prohibited include artificial insemination and in vitro fertili-
zation. Prior to the publication of Donum Vitae, Kevin Kelly examined the
question “How far is the Roman Catholic position on contraception a deter-
mining factor in its assessing the morality of IVF?” He analyzed various state-
ments by the Catholic bishops in Britain, addresses by Pope Pius XII, and
theological analysis by Richard McCormick, SJ. He noted that since the pos-
ition in Pope Paul VI’s  encyclical Humane Vitae regarding contraception
is a conclusion drawn from the more fundamental premise that the unitive
and procreative aspects of sexual activity must be held together, this funda-
mental premise would be important when looking at in vitro fertilization
(IVF). Humanae Vitae’s concern is to maintain the union of the unitive and
procreative in the conjugal act, while IVF separates the unitive and procrea-
tive “outside the sexual act.”
The CDF in Donum Vitae did end up arguing that the unitive and procrea-
tive goods of marriage and their connection with sexuality needed to be
upheld. The CDF states, “Indeed, by its intimate structure, the conjugal act,
while most closely uniting husband and wife, makes them capable of the gen-
eration of new lives, according to laws inscribed in the very being of man and
of woman.” In other words, conjugal activity by design is both unitive and
procreative. After noting that this structure has implications for responsible
parenthood, the CDF cites Humanae Vitae: “By safeguarding both these
essential aspects, the unitive and the procreative, the conjugal act preserves
in its fullness the sense of true mutual love and its ordination toward man’s
exalted vocation to parenthood.” The CDF concludes that there is a connec-
tion here regarding the use of contraception and what occurs in homologous
artificial fertilization, so that neither is permissible because of the underlying
premise that the conjugal act is both unitive and procreative. Contraception
and artificial insemination, albeit in different ways, sever the link between
the unitive and procreative aspects of the conjugal act, and undermine the
connection between the unitive and procreative goods of marriage. What
holds true for artificial insemination also holds true for in vitro fertilization.
 Kelly, Life and Love, chap. , esp. pp. –, at –. In the postscript, Kelly indicated
that he knew that the CDF would be issuing a document.
 Donum Vitae, II, B, , citing Humanae Vitae, art. .










































Therefore, the CDF argues that by seeking procreation outside of the conjugal
act by using artificial insemination or IVF, a couple incorrectly permits a sep-
aration of the goods of marriage and undermines the link between the goods
of marriage and the conjugal act.
While the CDF argues that many reproductive technologies are illicit,
they sanction technologies that correct underlying medical conditions
and as a result permit procreation to happen through the conjugal
act. For example, hormonal treatments to correct for low or high levels
that contribute to infertility, surgery for endometriosis, clearing blocked fallo-
pian tubes, and treating varicocele are acceptable. However, for many
couples, the solution might not be so simple, particularly if permitted treat-
ments do not change their infertile status. If couples choose to follow the
Roman Catholic Church’s instruction and not avail themselves of the prohib-
ited reproductive technologies, how are they to understand the inseparability
of the unitive and procreative aspects of their married life and their conjugal
activity, especially when procreation is understood as bringing forth biologi-
cal children?
For many who suffer from infertility, the Roman Catholic Church’s
instruction prohibits a method for fulfilling the mandate or blessing emanat-
ing from Genesis : to “be fruitful and multiply.” Alongside the presupposi-
tions that one will be able to have children, the Roman Catholic emphasis on
the contributions of married couples as parents, and the belief that children
are a “gift” and “blessing” from God, put the couple in a bind. Ryan describes
this bind as a “paradoxical and ultimately untenable position.” This position
results from the emphasis on the fullness of marriage culminating in parent-
hood and not having the “right to expect that they will be able to participate in
this ‘expected’ role.” The CDF in Donum Vitae then says that certain methods
the couple might use for moving out of this bind and fulfilling their “expected”
role as Christian parents are off-limits.
Complicating this reality for women is the Roman Catholic Church’s dis-
cussions about women as wives, mothers, and virgins, and their societal roles.
With roots in Scripture, the tradition’s dominant stream maintains that a
woman’s primary role is motherhood, fulfilled by becoming a wife and
bearing children, or in the case of religious women, spiritual motherhood.
 Donum Vitae, II, B, –; Dignitas Personae, arts.  and .
 The first three are discussed in Dignitas Personae. While varicocele is not listed, given the
criteria for permitting the first three, treating varicocele would be permitted. See Dignitas
Personae, art. .
 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Family: A Christian Social Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
), –.
 Ryan, The Ethics and Economics of Assisted Reproduction, –.










































This sensibility is slowly changing because of work by Ann O’Hara Graff,
Donna Teevan, Elizabeth Johnson and others, even as the virgin/mother
myth remains deeply embedded in our theological imaginations and some
ecclesial writings. A woman’s vocation as mother comes to the fore
when Pope John Paul II exhorts women to model Mary, in whom “The
Church sees … the highest expression of the ‘feminine genius’… . Through obe-
dience to the word of God she accepted her lofty yet not easy vocation as wife
and mother in the family of Nazareth.” Evidence of the virgin/mother con-
struction materializes in the Apostolic LetterMulieris Dignitatem, where John
Paul II says of Mary that “virginity and motherhood co-exist in her: they do not
mutually exclude each other or place limits on each other. Indeed, the person
of [Mary] helps everyone—especially women—to see how these two dimen-
sions, these two paths in the vocation of women as persons, explain and com-
plete each other.” However, the infertile married woman is neither a
perpetual virgin like Mary nor usually a biological mother. Therefore, the
CDF instruction places some women in a quandary, because it creates a
tension between the Roman Catholic teaching on the nature and vocation
of women as primarily virgins or mothers and its reproductive teaching,
which closes a biological motherhood option for infertile women.
 For work analyzing Roman Catholic theological anthropology regarding women, see
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology
(Boston: Beacon Press, , ), esp. chap. . For constructive attempts toward a fem-
inist retrieval of anthropology see Ann O’Hara Graff, ed., In the Embrace of God: Feminist
Approaches to Theological Anthropology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, ); Anne Carr
and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, eds., Motherhood: Experience, Institution, Theology
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, ); Donna Teevan, “Challenges to the Role of Theological
Anthropology in Feminist Theologies,” Theological Studies . (September ):
–; Susan Abraham and Elena G. Procario-Foley, eds., Frontiers in Catholic
Feminist Theology: Shoulder to Shoulder (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, ), esp. pt. .
 Pope John Paul II, “Letter of John Paul II to Women,” June , , http://www.vatican.
va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_let__women_en.html,
art.  (emphasis in the original).
 Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Letter, On the Dignity and Vocation of Women (Mulieris
Dignitatem), August , , http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apos
t_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl__mulieris-dignitatem_en.html, art. . For
similar reasoning, see Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation, On the Role of the
Christian Family in the Modern World (Familiaris Consortio), November , ,
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/
hf_jp-ii_exh__familiaris-consortio_en.html, esp. arts. – (emphasis in the
original).
 While I would like to say this conundrum does not exist, I have had too many conversa-
tions with Catholics who tell me that this is how they see their reality.










































One reason this predicament exists can be found in the statement from
Donum Vitae cited earlier. To drive home the point, I cite it in a fuller form:
The Church’s teaching on marriage and human procreation affirms the
“inseparable connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man
on his own initiative, between the two meanings of the conjugal act: the
unitive meaning and the procreative meaning. Indeed, by its intimate
structure, the conjugal act, while more closely uniting husband and wife,
makes them capable of the generation of new lives, according to laws
inscribed in the very being of man and of woman. . . .” “By safeguarding
both these essential aspects, the unitive and procreative, the conjugal act
preserves in its fullness the sense of true mutual love and its ordination
toward man’s exalted vocation to parenthood.”
This statement says to the married couple, particularly to the woman, that the
Church teaches that children are a blessing of marriage and they are the gen-
erative end of the conjugal act. This declaration also implies that men are by
vocation called to be fathers. Furthermore, John Paul II’s teaching that fathers
take a more active parenting role is necessary and valid.However, I have not
found any teaching that restricts men’s vocation to fatherhood. Indeed, men
are assumed to have other vocations besides fatherhood. Therefore, given the
Roman Catholic Church’s teaching regarding the nature of women and the
role of men in the family, I would argue that the CDF in Donum Vitae also
does not assume that males are tied to their vocation of fatherhood, but
does claim that women’s primary vocation is motherhood.
Yet if a woman or her husband is infertile, Roman Catholic teaching
denies a woman a means of reaching her (or their) generative function and
vocation in marriage. Hence, using the same underlying premise for exclud-
ing contraception and for banning certain types of reproductive technologies
is somewhat problematic, since in Humanae Vitae “procreative” is under-
stood as biological procreation. The desire to preserve and protect the inse-
parability of the unitive and procreative goods of marriage, manifested in
the conjugal act is valuable, but the inseparability collapses in light of inferti-
lity. A married couple’s infertility demonstrates the fallacy of always insisting
on conjoining the unitive and procreative goods of marriage and dimensions
of conjugal activity when one understands procreation only as biological pro-
creation. This raises the question of how we understand procreativity as a
good of marriage if biological procreation is not possible.
The CDF in Donum Vitae offers a potential way forward when it implicitly
argues that nature does not dictate a woman’s vocation to be mothers. It does
 Donum Vitae, II, B, .
 Pope John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio, arts. , , and .










































so when it writes, “The fidelity of the spouses in the unity of marriage involves
reciprocal respect of their right to become a father and a mother only through
each other.” While this statement could reference the embodied aspect of
cocreating a child, an alternative reading is possible, one that highlights the
reality that men and women become parents in relationship to each other.
Female nature does not make a woman a mother any more than male
nature makes a man a father. The CDF makes a nod in the direction of
acknowledging that parenthood is more about decision, commitment, and
relationality than simply a biological connection. It is the sacrifice for and
care of a vulnerable dependent human child together that forge the identity
of a mother or father.
Furthermore, Donum Vitae states that “marriage does not confer upon the
spouse the right to have a child.” While contributing to the bind of married
couples noted earlier, this statement could be interpreted as saying that bio-
logical procreation is not necessary for a valid and fruitful marriage. Thus the
CDF, on its own terms, challenges the belief that a person, particularly a
woman, is incomplete without a biological child. If this is so, then to maintain
the inseparability of the unitive and procreative goods of marriage, procrea-
tion needs to be more broadly construed as generativity. Generativity can
encompass biological procreation yet also provides a framework for perceiv-
ing “fruitfulness”more broadly. In fact, section  of Donum Vitae hints at how
the infertile couple might understand procreation in a more expansive way.
Here, the couple is encouraged to examine other gifts they might have to
offer, with which they might serve the community of believers. There is a
responsibility to God and the community to develop those gifts and use
them. Infertility, while dashing hopes, also invites the couple to examine in
a new way what their role is, or should be, in the larger community.
 Donum Vitae, II, A,  (emphasis in the original). This section cross-references Gaudium
et Spes, art. .
 Donum Vitae, II, B, .
 In fact, John Paul II does offer an alternative understanding of procreation: procreation of
a just society, dedicated to God. In his “Letter to Women” he makes reference to Genesis
: (“Fill the earth and subdue it”), interpreting it as referring to both procreation and
the transformation of the earth. He states, “In this task, which is essentially that of culture,
man and woman alike share equal responsibility from the start. . . . To this ‘unity of two’
[husband and wife] God has entrusted not only the work of procreation and family life,
but the creation of history itself” (art.  [emphasis in the original]). In other words,
women and men have an equal role both in the public sphere and in their roles as
parents. This understanding of vocation does not restrict women to the vocations of
mothers and virgins. Rather, like men, women have vocations and contributions to
make toward the common good in addition to parenthood.










































Likewise, the CDF states that the full ecclesial community must consider how
they will welcome and incorporate the infertile or childless into their midst.
Unfortunately, this responsibility on the part of the couple and the commu-
nity is not explained well.
Despite the fact that I find Donum Vitae’s reasoning in support of the pro-
hibition on reproductive technologies lacking, I do acknowledge that the CDF
recognizes that reproductive technologies are not morally neutral. The CDF
also provides support for another option that those who are infertile may
have, namely, the option to say “no” to reproductive technologies and the
“infertility treadmill.” However, given the CDF proscription on the use of
most reproductive technologies, the Church needs to grapple with the theo-
logical implications of this teaching for the lived experience of the faithful, its
theological anthropology, and the understanding of marriage as inseparably
unitive and procreative. One way to do this would be to develop a theology
of infertility that helps women and men not feel like failures, that counters
the sense that they have somehow found disfavor with God or that they are
incomplete members of the Body of Christ. Any formulation of a theology
of infertility would require honoring the suffering caused by infertility and
would need to uphold the dignity, worth, gifts, and contributions of infertile
women and men, and the infertile couple. Furthermore, a theology of inferti-
lity would break the silence of the Church on this matter and permit a more
thoughtful, compassionate embracing of all members of the Body of Christ.
I propose we move forward and begin to formulate a theology of infertility.
The next section offers steps for starting that work.
. Toward Crafting a Theology of Infertility
Given that people experience infertility, it is important that practical
steps to address this reality be taken as a theology of infertility is developed.
My suggestions fall into three general categories: societal, ecclesial, and theo-
logical. The first two are more praxis-oriented.
Societal
These suggested changes involve our daily encounters with people. We
should be deliberate with the type of questions we ask. Let others take the
lead in speaking about their children or lack thereof. We need to resist the
urge to resort to platitudes when encountering the suffering of those who
are infertile. We should be willing to have non-child- centered conversations.
 Donum Vitae, II, B, .










































And we should be courageous in thinking and discussing both the good that
can come from reproductive technologies and the negative consequences of
the technology, while always being mindful to honor the stories and experi-
ences of those who have suffered the pain of infertility.
Ecclesial
The ecclesial proposals might appear more pastoral than theological.
However, changed ecclesial practices, in addition to meeting needs among
the faithful, could foster an awareness for a theology of infertility. By imple-
menting changes, ecclesial communities rise to Mercy Amba Oduyoye’s chal-
lenge to address the pain and suffering of infertility, breaking the Christian
church’s silence. This is important because, as Ryan highlights, infertility is
not only a “medical or social crisis” but also a “spiritual crisis, a deep confron-
tation of meaning and belief.” Acknowledging the spiritual dimension of
infertility allows one to engage resources within the tradition to help people
grapple with loss and self-transformation, to hold onto hope, to heal, to
forgo the pursuit of a technological solution, and to arrive at a new sense of
self. The Church must accompany its people in their spiritual distress.
Consequently, attending to homilies, bulletin inserts, and church events
around particular holy days while recognizing that such feasts can be a test
of faith or a source of great sorrow for infertile couples can help to break
the silence. For example, Christmas, which focuses on the birth of a baby,
Emmanuel, poses particular challenges for those longing for a child.
Celebrations and blessings of mothers and fathers in church on Mother’s
Day or Father’s Day can be alienating, since they often overlook those who
are infertile. These celebrations can be more inclusive if they seek ways to
recognize “the pain of longing for parenthood” and incorporate this recog-
nition “liturgically alongside the joy and struggles of its [parenthood] realiz-
ation.” On the other hand, Pentecost provides a great resource to preach
on the power of the Holy Spirit and the gifts provided to the Church on
that day. How can this feast help us think beyond the usual gifts from God
that include but are not limited to children? How can we name, recognize,
and honor these other gifts of the members of the Body of Christ on a
more deliberate, consistent basis?
Changing and adapting the marriage rite to include the possibility that
children might not arrive needs consideration. When the couple is asked to
commit to each other “in good times and in bad, in sickness and in health,
for richer or poorer,” “with or without biological children” could be added.
 Ryan, The Ethics and Economics of Assisted Reproduction, .
 Ibid., .










































We acknowledge that health might decline, material circumstances will
change—why not acknowledge that biological children may or may not
arrive? One resource within the marriage rite already makes this acknowledg-
ment. The prayers highlight the rich dimensions of marriage and express the
community’s hopes that the marriage will facilitate service to the world, foster
growth in holiness, increase trust between spouses, shape a shared life
together, function as sign of the union between Christ and his Church,
serve as a witness to the world of divine love, function as an image of the cove-
nant between God and God’s people, and be blessed with children. These
are wide-ranging hopes for the marriage, whereby children are one hope
among many. We need to admit, and discover how to communicate, that
prayers that make reference to children actually request that God may
grant or bless the couple with children. Liturgically, the prayers and blessings
admit the reality that biological children might not arrive. Frank discussions
regarding this reality could also help break the silence surrounding infertility
and begin facilitating discussions about the gifts of the childless within the
community, as well as broader understandings of procreativity as a good of
marriage.
However, changed practices are not enough. The cultural assumptions
surrounding reproductive technologies discussed in section  still need
more developed theological responses.
Theological
Theological resources exist within the tradition to counter the cultural
notions of freedom and finitude operative in the celebration of reproductive
technologies, specifically Karl Rahner’s notion of theological concupis-
cence. For Rahner, theological concupiscence is the category with which
to discuss the relationship and essential tension between human fini-
tude (nature) and human freedom (person). This tension between
nature (finitude) and person (freedom) exists as an existential of human
existence.
 The Sacramentary (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co., ), –.
 The infertile are most aware of the blessing and gift language surrounding children. This
awareness springs from the fact that they are not included in the group so blessed and
gifted, and creates its own theological and spiritual distress for them as they wonder
why God is withholding gifts and blessings from them.
 Karl Rahner, “The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia,” in Theological Investigations,
vol. , God, Christ, Mary, and Grace, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon Press,
), –.
 Ibid.,  ff.










































Nature, according to Rahner, is “that which is pre-established for free
personal control and which serves as the norm of [a] decision.” Nature
serves as the norm of any decision, because it is what the Creator created,
our essence—the clay of the potter, so to speak. Person, on the other hand,
is “what this being in freedom makes of itself and as how it wants to under-
stand itself.” It is how the human wants to shape and form her being and life
through the choices made and actions undertaken. However, freedom does
not arise from nothing; it requires that which is embodied, prior to
expression, in our nature. Nature forms the a priori basis for any decision
or action in freedom. In other words, nature sets the preconditions for any
action. However, these preconditions are transcended through freedom and
subsequent actions.
All actions engage varying depths of our being, and thus embody our
values and beliefs. Rahner states, “Seen from a Christian point of view, the
idea of responsible freedom changes greatly and becomes immensely
deeper when it is seen that man can determine and decide himself as a
whole by his freedom . . . and that he therefore posits acts which must not
merely be qualified morally and then pass away again.” In other words,
acts are not just momentary blips in our lives. Acts have effects that influence
not only present but also future actions, our way of being in the world, and
our relationships. If Rahner is correct that we determine our identity and
shape the direction of our lives by our actions, then the possibility exists
that struggles with infertility and reactions to reproductive technologies indi-
cate that infertile couples are engaging their freedom more deeply than
freedom-of-choice language implies.
Given the reality that reproductive technologies do not always
succeed, theological concupiscence provides a theological foundation for
 Karl Rahner, “The Passion and Asceticism,” in Theological Investigations, vol. , The
Theology of the Spiritual Life, trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon
Press, ), .
 Ibid.
 Rahner maintains that the “finite person itself is at the same time always also a nature.”
He further states that there is “no point in the concrete existence of man . . . which is not
affected by the fate of the nature in the person.” This is because “the possibilities of per-
sonal existence always rest essentially on the possibilities of the nature.” In other words,
nature forms the contours of the conditions within which freedom acts (Rahner, “The
Passion and Asceticism,” ).
 Karl Rahner, “Guilt—Responsibility—Punishment within the View of Catholic Theology,”
in Theological Investigations, vol. , Concerning Vatican Council II, trans. Karl-H. and
Boniface Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon Press, ), –. While Rahner ultimately talks
about salvation and damnation in this particular passage, there is insight here for consid-
ering responses to infertility.










































understanding the uncertainty in any response to infertility. Theological con-
cupiscence accentuates the lack of certainty and the elusiveness of many
moral decisions and actions. There remains something irresolute in the
relationship between our finitude and our freedom, something that questions
the decision made or the action taken, or elements to be considered that we
simply do not yet recognize; there is a remainder of sorts. This means that
every decision or action undertaken entails risk. The risk is that we will be
more wrong or more wonderfully right than we ever imagined.
Moreover, any response to infertility will require grappling with some
form of suffering, since nature (finitude) can never be fully overcome by
freedom. Rahner describes how the tension between our finitude and our
freedom manifests itself in the experiences of human Passion. Passion as
humans experience it is not the Passion of Christ, but the aspect of human
existence “characterized by what we normally call pain, suffering, anxiety,
fear, death,” and so forth. This is experienced as any “diminution of a
natural condition of existence or activity”—stated differently, as an experience
of finitude.
When discussing human Passion, Rahner makes a crucial distinction
between the natural and personal aspects of this human experience. The
natural is related to what we experience biologically or that which other crea-
tures would also experience. The personal refers to what occurs “within the
natural sphere” as experienced by a human being. In other words, the per-
sonal indicates a degree of freedom in thinking, acting, and deciding about
one’s “reality,” “own being,” and “life.” The personal transcends simple
empirical analysis of the natural experience. The natural and personal experi-
ential aspects of Passion help explain why infertility is not simply a matter of
biology. The biological effects of infertility manifest themselves in personal
ways, raising questions about identity, purpose, and a person’s life narrative.
Rahner recognizes that suffering is part of every decision engaging the depth
of human freedom. Suffering occurs because every decision involves renun-
ciation; deciding in favor of some possibilities means closing off other possi-
bilities. Freedom seen as truth-to-self will necessitate “suffering” or the
closing of certain possibilities. For example, for those who are infertile, this
actuality reveals itself when they let go of hopes for biological children.
 Rahner, “The Passion and Asceticism,” –. In this article Rahner does not use
“passion” to mean human emotions or intense emotion, as “passion” sometimes indi-
cates in English usage. Rather, he uses it as a description of a state of existence, a
matrix within which one lives, rather than a particular emotion or feeling. As such, I
will follow the translator in capitalizing “Passion” to distinguish this existential state
from a particular quality or type of emotion.
 Rahner, “The Passion and Asceticism,” .










































Thus, infertility is one particular expression of the existential reality that, for
all human beings, freedom never completely transcends finitude. However,
while Rahner’s concept of theological concupiscence can help us think
about the tension between freedom and finitude in the context of infertility,
on its own it is insufficient for a theology of infertility.
A robust theology of infertility also means theologically contesting the cul-
tural and religious notions regarding childlessness noted earlier. A starting
point could be perceiving Genesis’ call to be fruitful and to multiply as a
call not just for individuals but also for the human race. If humanity is to
be fruitful and multiplying, can we consider how procreation might not be
a necessity for all human couples? This would require a conversation about
the identity and place of childless couples in the community and the Body
of Christ. What is their role? Would a better understanding of the celibate’s
role in the community help us think about the role of the childless within
the community? Giving a satisfactory answer to the questions regarding
childless couples’ contributions to the Body of Christ means we must
attend to several underlying foundational issues.
First, can we more explicitly articulate a belief that childless marriages are
valid vocations? This is a difficult question to answer. Given the operative
norm that the fruit of marriage is children, our ability to answer in the affir-
mative depends on our ability to give theological support for an expanded
notion of procreation. The theological move from the goods of marriage
being unitive and procreative to being unitive and generative, where “genera-
tive” includes biological procreativity, is central to a theology of infertility.
This would help create space for infertile couples to think about their mar-
riages as not empty and barren, but rather as fruitful. Among others,
Bonnie Miller-McLemore and Christine Gudorf have already done some
work in the area of generativity, but more needs to be done. Mercy Amba
Oduyoye indicates the value of seeing procreativity differently, where the
 Dale Launderville’s work exploring where the celibate fits into the structure and function-
ing of the ancient household has promise for understanding and articulating more expli-
citly how we understand the childless in contemporary culture. See his Celibacy in the
Ancient World (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, ).
 This is a slight rewording of a question posed by Kelly in Life and Love, .
 See, e.g., Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “Produce or Perish: A Feminist Critique of
Generativity,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review .– (): –; Miller-
McLemore, “Generativity, Self-Sacrifice, and the Ethics of Family Life,” in Equal-
Regard Family and Its Friendly Critics, ed. John Witte Jr., M. Christian Green, and Amy
Wheeler (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, ), –; Christine Gudorf, “Papal Ideals,
Marital Realities: One View from the Ground,” in Sexual Diversity and Catholicism:
Toward the Development of Moral Theology, ed. Patricia Beattie Jung and Joseph
Andrew Coray (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, ), –; Gudorf,










































infertile could claim that their lives were lived as a doxology to God, and their
creative command became “increase in humanity. Multiply the likeness to
God for which you have the potential. Multiply the fullness of humanity
that is found in Christ. Fill the earth with the glory of God. Increase in crea-
tivity. Bring into being that which God can look upon and pronounce
‘good,’ even ‘very good.’”
The second foundational issue that needs further work in developing a
theology of infertility concerns Mary. Analysis of how a theological anthropol-
ogy that prioritizes Mary’s virginity and motherhood as a central image that
shapes views about women’s vocation must continue. Mary is important,
but what understanding of women and vision of women’s vocations would
arise if other scriptural images of women were also integrated into our theo-
logical heritage? Is it possible to shatter the duality of the virgin/mother con-
struct for women so that roles other than vowed life or motherhood are
appreciated and supported as a valid response to God’s call? Studying the
role of other women in Scripture, such as Miriam, Deborah, and Phoebe
would help develop a more robust theological anthropology and understand-
ing of vocation for women. Doing so would provide alternative visions for
identity formation when biological motherhood is not an option.
. Conclusion
The operating premise of this article is that a theology of infertility
needs to be developed as a response to questions raised by infertility.
Section  indicated some challenges facing human self-understanding in
light of infertility and our cultural response to reproductive technologies.
These challenges include how our comprehension of freedom, finitude,
and embodiment, responses to childlessness, and views of parenthood are
shaped by cultural presuppositions. A theology of infertility would need to
offer alternative constructions for understanding freedom, finitude, embodi-
ment, childlessness, and parenthood. Section  examined the Roman Catholic
Church’s teaching on reproductive technologies and raised additional chal-
lenges in two areas: theological anthropology and the understanding of the
inseparability of the unitive and procreative goods of marriage. The analysis
of Donum Vitae also yielded insights toward maintaining the inseparability
of the unitive and procreative goods of marriage in light of childlessness
“Resymbolizing Life: Religion on Population and Environment,” Horizons . ():
–, at –.
 Oduyoye, “A Coming Home to Myself,” .










































and discerning gifts to be offered to the community. Additionally, Donum
Vitae with its prohibition of many types of reproductive technologies provides
an alternative to the “infertility treadmill.” However, saying “no” to the tech-
nology needs to be placed within the context of a more robust theological
vision of women’s vocations, a richer understanding of procreativity, and sen-
sitivity to and pastoral responses attentive to the implications of the teaching
in the lives of the faithful.
As a result, suggestions were made in section  for implementing societal
and ecclesial practices that would foster awareness of infertility and sensitivity
to the infertile in our communities. Karl Rahner’s notion of theological con-
cupiscence was used to show an alternative way of considering freedom
and finitude. Finally, additional places within the tradition and Scripture
that might yield fruit for crafting a theology of infertility were suggested.
Doing the further work needed to craft a theology of infertility would continue
the process of raising awareness and breaking the silence surrounding infer-
tility in communities and would provide an alternative to the cultural vision
celebrating reproductive technologies while ignoring their costs.
 I wish to thank my theology colleagues at the College of St. Benedict/St. John’s University
and the School of Theology-Seminary for discussing the topic of this paper with me. My
thanks also to the graduate students who wrote sample bulletin inserts and homilies as
class assignments and who helped determine how these practices would be helpful in
their parishes. Finally, my thanks to the anonymous reviewers for Horizons for their
insightful and helpful comments.
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